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# **A Year of Hate: Anti-Drag Mobilisation Efforts Targeting LGBTQ+ People in France**



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## Executive Summary

**From 2022 to 2023, a loose network of actors from Bordeaux to Toulouse to Paris targeted drag events aimed at all-ages audiences for protest, harassment and abuse. The behaviours and dynamics observed among these actors echo and mirror those observed in other parts of the world, particularly the US.**

While anti-drag action in France remains marginal compared to the activity witnessed in the US, UK and Australia, it nonetheless emerged as a phenomenon from a standing start in 2022. March 2023 saw the nation's first in-person protest at an all-ages drag event in Paris<sup>1</sup>, and two months later a far-right group protested with banners and a smoke bomb outside of a library hosting a drag queen story hour (DQSH) for children in the small village of Saint-Senoux.<sup>2</sup>

A seemingly unlikely group of actors is leading this charge. The French anti-gender movement, who were at the heart of the movement against equal marriage in the early 2010s, have been joined by far-right parties and politicians, extremist groups, COVID-19 sceptics and assorted conspiracy theorists. All are seeking to cancel drag events through tactics of protest, petitions, harassment, misinformation and intimidation.

This briefing provides in-depth analysis of five cases of anti-drag mobilisation in the period December 2022 – May 2023, using a combination of ethnographic methods and social media data analysis to examine activity related to each case. The first was in Bordeaux, the second in Lamballe-Armor, the third in Toulouse, the fourth in Paris, and the fifth in Saint-Senoux. While the earlier campaigns largely manifested online with limited in-person mobilisation, the two most recent events saw increased offline activity.

This country profile is part of an ISD series examining anti-drag activity across various geographies including the US, UK, and Australia, and highlights the transnational dimension of anti-drag mobilisation. This report aims to summarise the key narratives, tactics and actors involved in anti-drag action in France, and how these mobilisations are tied to anti-LGBTQ+ activity in France more broadly. However, given the small number of instances of anti-drag activism in France, the conclusions of this report are indicative and tentative.

## Key Findings

- **Anti-drag mobilisation forms a nexus connecting ideologically diverse movements in France.** Across all five incidents analysed as part of this research, ISD found politicians and political parties or movements, far-right media and local far-right groups, conspiracy theorists, and COVID-19 sceptic actors were all active in the campaigns to cancel anti-drag events. This agglomeration of apparently disparate groups indicates that anti-drag rhetoric has the potential to unite a range of ideologically-motivated groups from across the political spectrum, and echoes similar findings in other geographies.
- **Actors who previously shared misinformation and conspiracies related to COVID-19 appear to have added anti-LGBTQ advocacy to their repertoire.** Some COVID-19 sceptics and other groups within the French conspiracy ecosystem - particularly those targeting parents – were found by analysts to promote narratives around ‘grooming’ and ‘protection of children’.
- **In-person mobilisation is an increasingly present component of anti-drag activity in France.** While online activity was the primary modality for mobilisation in the first three cases analysed for this report, in-person protests occurred at more recent drag events in Paris and Saint-Senoux. This demonstrates the evolving tactics of anti-drag activists and indicates the risk of online actions sowing the seeds for the kinds of ongoing offline campaigns seen in the US and UK.
- **The narratives deployed by anti-drag actors in France are highly similar to those employed in the US.** Actors often directly quote US influencers and share US-related content, indicating the influence which US activity has across the Atlantic.
- **ISD found signs of potential coordinated behaviour in the posting and sharing of a 2023 anti-drag petition.** Created by Eric Zemmour’s party Reconquête, the petition shared striking similarities to a series of petitions created in 2022 that ISD previously found to have been shared inauthentically by Zemmour’s campaign team.<sup>3</sup>

## Timeline

### 11/12/22 Bordeaux<sup>4</sup>

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A holiday cabaret for children was scheduled in Bordeaux, which included a performance by a drag queen. Various actors (mostly from the far-right, such as FDesouche and Boulevard Voltaire<sup>5</sup>) began to protest this event on social media. This event was discussed in French national media<sup>6</sup> as the controversial TV show *Touche Pas A Mon Poste*<sup>7</sup> (TPMP) dedicated a segment of its daily show of 5 December 2022 to this event before it took place. The drag performer was harassed on Instagram and subsequently requested her followers to report the TPMP segment to the French regulatory body, Arcom, stating that the show had shared “false information and anti-LGBTQ+ propaganda”.<sup>8</sup>

### 16/01/23 Lamballe-Armor<sup>9</sup>

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A DQSH for children and their parents was scheduled as part of a festival promoting inclusion and diversity, in the public library of Lamballe-Armor. After the Bordeaux event, various actors including the right-wing religious movement VIA (Voie du Peuple) attempted to have the event cancelled. They were unsuccessful, and the event took place (with increased security).<sup>10</sup>

### 18/02/23 Toulouse<sup>11</sup>

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Two drag queens had scheduled a DQSH for children in a public library. A social media campaign was orchestrated by various actors including the local far-right group *Furie Française*.<sup>12</sup> They set up an online petition and mobilised in the streets of Toulouse to protest the event. The Mayor of Toulouse eventually requested to limit the event to an adult-only audience, which led the two performers hosting the event to cancel it.

### 11/03/23 Paris<sup>13</sup>

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As part of an annual program focused on cultivating equality hosted by Paris City Hall in March, a local recreation centre near *Butte-aux-Cailles* held a DQSH for children. Anti-drag actors, particularly supporters of *Éric Zemmour's Reconquête* party, took to social media to complain about the event and coordinate in-person protests. Despite their presence and propagation of anti-drag messages, the story hour was held without incident<sup>14</sup>.

### 13/05/23 Saint-Senoux<sup>15</sup>

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Members of the far-right group *L'Oriflamme Rennes* protested outside of a workshop titled ‘Gender equality, let’s talk about it’, hosted in the small village of Saint-Senoux by drag collective *The Space Circus*.<sup>16</sup> Approximately twenty masked individuals protested outside of the venue with a smoke bomb and banners, and the French political party *Rassemblement National* (National Rally, RN) reportedly distributed leaflets ahead of the event asking to cancel it.<sup>17</sup> The workshop still took place with increased security presence and community support, and the founder of *L'Oriflamme Rennes* was recently sentenced to four months in prison and fined for his role in the protest.<sup>18</sup>

## Glossary

### 5G Conspiracy Theory

A conspiracy theory whose believers assert that 5G technology – which underpins the current fastest mobile phone networks – is being implemented for sinister purposes. These include the spreading of the COVID-19 virus.

### Anti-lockdown

The term ‘anti-lockdown’ has come to stand in for a range of positions held by individuals who broadly oppose the implementation of restrictions on individual freedoms in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Anti-lockdown individuals or groups may advocate for alternative approaches, such as emphasising individual responsibility or the prioritisation of other societal needs alongside public health considerations.

### Anti-vaccine

The terms ‘vaccine sceptic’ and ‘anti-vaxxer’ cover a wide range of attitudes that are characterised by distrust of a specific vaccine or vaccines in general. Vaccine sceptics are not categorically opposed to vaccines but have reservations of varying degrees about them. Certain vaccine sceptics accept some vaccines but reject others, sometimes including the COVID-19 vaccines. By way of contrast, anti-vaxxer are fundamentally opposed to vaccines. Their reasons range from suppositions derived from conspiracy theories to the deeply held belief that all vaccines represent a harmful intervention into the body’s biochemical processes.

### Christian nationalist

Christian nationalism has multiple definitions, but for ISD’s purposes it is understood to be an ideology that “idealises and advocates a fusion of Christianity and American [or Australian, or British] civic life” (Whitehead and Perry 2020:10). Christianity in this form is typically racialised (as white) and exclusionary (implying that other religions cannot or should not be part of the nation).

### Doxxing

Searching for and publishing the private data of individuals or organisations on the internet, usually with malicious intent.

### Drag Queen Story Hour (DQSH)

An event in which a drag performer (typically, though not always, a drag queen – usually a man dressed in female gendered clothes) reads books or tells stories, normally to children.

### Extremism

Extremism is the advocacy of a system of belief that claims the superiority and dominance of one identity-based ‘in-group’ over all ‘out-groups.’ It propagates a dehumanising ‘othering’ mind-set that is antithetical to pluralism and the universal application of Human Rights.

### Far-right

ISD’s definition of far-right is in line with far-right expert Cas Mudde, who conceptualises ‘far-right’ as an umbrella term that includes both radical right-wing and extreme right-wing actors. Mudde states that both radical and extreme right-wing actors believe that “inequalities between people are natural and positive” but have differing attitudes towards democracy. Radical right-wing actors are not against democracy in principle, while extreme right-wing actors reject democracy as a form of government.

### Misinformation

ISD defines misinformation as false, misleading or manipulated content shared irrespective of an intent to deceive or harm.

### Parents’ rights

In the context of this report, ‘parents’ rights’ groups are organisations or collections of individuals whose unifying objective is to advocate for the rights of parents to choose the kinds of materials, lifestyles, ideologies and beliefs their children are exposed to. In this context, they may oppose the hosting of all-ages drag events or other events that showcase LGBTQ+ identities.

### Save The Children

In this context, Save The Children (often stylised #SaveTheChildren) is a conspiracy theory offshoot of QAnon, claiming that there is a wide-reaching conspiracy by powerful individuals who are trafficking children for the purposes of paedophilia and ritualistic abuse.

### **Sovereign Citizens**

The Sovereign Citizens movement comprises a highly heterogenous anti-government ideology that originated in the United States. Adherents are united in their belief that the US government illegitimately rules over them. They live under the assumption that by declaring themselves sovereign, they are not obliged to abide with government legislation.

While it is an ideology that has manifested in many different forms, contemporary interpretations are frequently linked to conspiratorial and extremist beliefs. US law enforcement agencies have labelled the movement a domestic terrorist threat. In recent years, anti-government sentiments in relation to imposed COVID-19 measures triggered a surge in popularity of Sovereign Citizens-related ideas in many national contexts.

### **White nationalism**

White nationalism is advocacy for a separate white society or white nation, also sometimes referred to as a white ethnostate. The Anti-Defamation League describes white nationalism as a euphemism for white supremacy; the term is now used to “refer to a form of white supremacy that emphasises defining a country or region by white racial identity and which seeks to promote the interests of whites exclusively, typically at the expense of people of other backgrounds”.

### **White supremacism**

White supremacy is a system of belief that posits the superiority of whites over non-whites, and advocates that white people should be politically and socially dominant over non-white people. This can extend to a belief in the need for violence against, or even the genocide of, non-white people.

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## Key Actors

**The actors involved in each anti-drag campaign bore notable similarities; far-right media and local groups, conspiracy theorists and COVID-19 sceptic actors, as well as politicians and political movements, were present across the five cases.**

### Politicians and political parties and movements

Anti-gender groups, which rose to prominence during the debate over equal marriage in the early 2010s, were involved in three of the campaigns against drag events assessed for this report. These include 'Syndicat de la Famille'<sup>19</sup> or 'Union for the Family', previously known as 'La Manif Pour Tous' 3(LMPT) or 'Protest for all'.<sup>20, 21</sup> This organisation was established to protest the Taubira law, which legalised same-sex marriage in France in 2013. Today, Syndicat de la Famille frames its opposition to drag performances in terms of "protecting the children",<sup>22</sup> echoing both narratives used throughout the anti-Taubira law protests and the rhetoric of anti-drag campaigns in other geographies.

Another French political organisation, 'Voie du Peuple'<sup>23</sup> or 'Way of the People', founded by Christine Boutin, set up a petition to protest the Lamballe-Armor event on Citizen Go.<sup>24</sup> As highlighted in previous research, Citizen Go is a right-wing online platform<sup>25</sup> that facilitates the coordination of international campaigns, including some which have been launched against LGBTQ+ rights as well as sexual and reproductive rights.

French far-right parties have also been part of the anti-drag movement, including representatives of Marine Le Pen's party Rassemblement National and Eric Zemmour's party Reconquête or 'Reconquest'. In the social media data collected by ISD around these events, local representatives and branches of Zemmour's party were actively involved in the online protests of four out of five events; for instance, local representative Arthur Cottrel was one of the ten most active accounts on X (formerly known as Twitter) in the online discussion tied to the drag event in Toulouse. National Reconquête figures such as Samuel Lafont (who was involved in 2013 in La Manif Pour Tous)<sup>26</sup> also took part in opposing the event.<sup>27</sup>

Figure 1: Screenshot of the petition set up by Voie du Peuple on the Citizen Go platform. This petition protests the January 2023 Lamballe-Armor DQSH by denouncing the “indoctrination of youth in Lamballe”.



Figure 3: Example of an X post from Jean-Michel Cadenas protesting the DQSH in Lamballe-Armor. He is described on the Rassemblement National website as the ‘delegue departemental’ (or local delegate) of Mayenne for the party.



Figure 2: Example of X post from ‘Syndicat de la Famille’, the new name of ‘La Manif Pour Tous’, protesting an event in Bordeaux which included the performance of a drag queen.



Figures 4 and 5: Examples of social media posts from accounts associated with Reconquête protesting drag shows.



### **Extreme right-wing and far-right media and actors**

Right-wing news sites FDesouche<sup>28</sup> and Breizh Info, as well as local far-right groups, also took part in anti-drag campaigns over this period. FDesouche - a far-right news aggregator that receives upwards of three million views per month<sup>29</sup> and was listed as a 'top five spreader of disinformation' by Le Monde<sup>30</sup> - was one of the initial instigators of online mobilisation against at least three of the events studied by ISD.

Far-right group La Furie Française<sup>31</sup> was also key to the protest against the Toulouse DQSH. La Furie Française was set up in November 2021 to continue the work of the identitarian group Generation Identity after its dissolution<sup>32</sup> in March 2021 by the French Interior Ministry. La Furie Française created a petition pushing to cancel the Toulouse DQSH and organised offline mobilisations in Toulouse to pressure the mayor to cancel the event. The X account of La Furie Française was one of the ten most active in the dataset tied to the online discussions of this event. Their petition was shared 1,150 times, making it the most shared link in data collected by ISD about the Toulouse event. Amplifiers included Reconquête accounts and well known far-right figures such as former Generation Identity spokesperson Thaïs d'Escufon.<sup>33</sup>

Figure 6: Article on the far-right website FDesouche which maps past and future drag events for children in France.



Figure 8: Screenshot of the mobilisation led by far-right group La Furie Française in Toulouse on Telegram.



Figure 7: Screenshot of the mobilisation led by far-right group La Furie Française in Toulouse on X.



Figure 9: Screenshot of the Telegram channel of Thais d'Escufon sharing the La Furie Française petition campaigning against the DQSH in Toulouse.



### Conspiracy theorists and COVID-19 sceptics

ISD found that both the French conspiracy ecosystem and COVID-19 sceptics were among the actors opposing the events in Bordeaux and Toulouse. On X, a post from the outlet Planetes360<sup>34,35</sup>, which is known for sharing conspiracy content, was among the 20 most shared posts in ISD's dataset.<sup>36</sup> Additionally, multiple French conspiracy channels on Telegram shared the petition from La Furie Française advocating for the cancellation of the DQSH in Toulouse.

Actors who previously shared misinformation and conspiracies related to COVID-19 appear to have added anti-drag advocacy to their repertoire, as part of a broadening of their content into anti-LGBTQ+ content. For instance, ISD found a Telegram channel that was dedicated to sharing conspiracy theories about COVID-19 has shifted focus to 'child grooming', even changing its name in the process. One of the 20 most shared posts on X was posted by a 'parent collective' that previously shared COVID-19-related misinformation. This narrative reframing is consistent with conspiracy communities in other countries, such as the US, where movements against pandemic restrictions and safety measures saw substantial overlap with parents' rights groups like Moms for Liberty, who have now shifted their focus to targeting all forms of "wokeness," including gender and sexuality diversity.<sup>37</sup>

Figure 10: Example of an X post by Planetes360.




Figure 11: Example of a post shared by a 'parent collective' protesting the drag event in Bordeaux, calling to 'protect children'. This group was previously active in protesting COVID-19 restrictions and shared misinformation and conspiracy theories about COVID-19 and the vaccine.



## Key Tactics

A key distinction between anti-drag activism in France and elsewhere is that, in three of the five cases analysed for this report, online activity was the primary modality for mobilisation. Since the analysis began in January 2023, two in-person protests at DQSHs occurred. As such, although these mobilisations have manifested largely online, there is a growing concern that these actions may sow the seeds for the kinds of ongoing offline campaigns seen in other geographies.

### Petitions


During this analysis, ISD found multiple petitions had been set up to protest drag events in France. One of these petitions was similar in format to a series of petitions created by the Zemmour campaign team in the lead-up to the 2022 presidential and legislative elections. In a previous investigation, ISD found these petitions had been shared inauthentically by the Zemmour campaign team, potentially violating both X and Facebook's policies.<sup>38</sup> This new petition was created by Zemmour's party Reconquête on 2 February 2023. This petition, in line with Reconquête's agitation against drag events in France, demands the cancellation of any 'LGBT' event in a public sphere for young audiences.

In total the petition was shared 896 times (103 times excluding reshares). There was a peak in shares between 8-10 March 2023 in reaction to a segment on drag performances on the TV show TPMP. Engagement with this petition was lower than the Zemmour campaign's previous petition, possibly due to the increased political engagement in 2022 in the lead-up to the presidential elections. Of the 103 original posts sharing the petition, 73 contained the same text. Most of these 47 duplicate posts were created on 8-9 March 2023. Signs of potential coordinated behaviour<sup>39</sup> were observed; however, ISD did not find evidence of inauthentic coordinated behaviour<sup>40</sup> on X or Facebook.

### Protesting

In-person protests at drag events themselves occurred in two of the five case studies analysed for this report, and in one case, protests occurred prior to the event. At the March DQSH in Paris's 13th arrondissement, approximately twenty individuals stood near the centre and passed out Reconquête leaflets. The words 'shame' and 'leave the children' (in French) had been spray-painted on the floor of the centre's entrance, and two

Figure 12, 13, 14 and 15: Screenshots of the Reconquête petition shared by four accounts using the exact same text. All post were originally shared in a limited timespan on 08/03/2023 (at 21:01:26, 21:02:22, 21:07:49, 21:12:07). Three out of the four accounts openly identify in their X profile as Zemmour/Reconquête supporters.



individuals had hung a banner that translates to “Drag queens with consenting adults, not our children”.<sup>41</sup>

In Saint-Senoux, members of the right-wing group L’Oriflamme Rennes - hooded and wearing black - carried smoke bombs and a banner stating “Instil our children with our roots, don’t impose drag queens”.<sup>42</sup> The only person identified during the protest was Paul Carton (known under the pseudonym Marc Visada), founder of the group and previously a leading figure of Rennes’ ‘Action Française’ movement, which split from the national royalist organisation to embrace neo-Nazi ideals.<sup>43</sup> During his prosecution for “provocation of hatred due to sexual orientation or gender identity”, Carton confessed to chanting hateful remarks into a megaphone, calling for drag queens to be kept out of public places and saying there should be “less trans” people and “LGBT degenerates” in France.<sup>44</sup>

Additionally, identitarian group La Furie Française engaged in street protests against the DQSH in Toulouse, which was eventually cancelled by the performers after the Mayor of Toulouse asked that organisers limit the event to adults-only, a request which the performers refused.

### **Online harassment and threats of violence**

Given that the primary medium of mobilisation for anti-drag activism has been online, online harassment has perhaps unsurprisingly been a significant tactic. In the Bordeaux case, as previously mentioned, the drag artist due to perform received substantial online harassment after several far-right websites covered her announced appearance, which further escalated after presenter Cyril Hanouna led a debate about the event on his television show.<sup>45</sup> In a statement posted to Instagram, the performer La Maryposa stated that a video of her was also circulating on the Instagram and Twitter pages of extremist groups and outlets, leading to a surge of abusive messages and death threats.<sup>46</sup>

## Key Narratives

**US anti-drag activism has set trends for the tactics and narratives used by actors in France, emphasising the increased transnationalism of rhetoric targeting drag events and the broader LGBTQ+ community.**

### Protecting Children

Firstly, actors protesting drag events have centred the idea of child protection, emphasising the supposed danger of young audiences being exposed to drag performances and using rhetoric around child indoctrination. ISD observed numerous calls for events to be cancelled which referenced anti-LGBTQ+ misinformation and conspiracy theories including 'child grooming' or 'child sacrifice', underlining the purportedly sexual nature of drag performances aimed at children. These narratives echo rhetoric deployed during the anti-Taubira law protests, where equal marriage and the right to adopt were depicted as a danger to children.<sup>47</sup>

Narratives of child protection mirror those deployed in the US, and ISD regularly observed French actors sharing US-related content and referencing US actors.

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Figures 16 and 17: Examples of posts shared in French Telegram channels importing content from the US. The first figure shares a screenshot from the X account 'Gays Against Groomers'. The second is a screenshot of two posts shared in a French white supremacist channel, sharing a video from a US militia Telegram channel of a rally in Columbus, Ohio against a drag story hour event. The second post in French celebrates the protest.



Figure 18: Screenshot of a post from a French Telegram channel claiming that the COVID-19 pandemic, abortion and drag shows all serve the purpose of 'child sacrifice'.



### Conflating drag performers and transgender individuals


ISD also found that actors commonly conflated drag performers with transgender and gender non-conforming people. Drag performers were commonly referred to as transgender, often using transphobic slurs and other hate speech, as well as other anti-trans narratives. This echoes ongoing and seemingly increasing attacks on transgender people and gender non-conforming people in France; in 2021, LGBTQ+ charity SOS Homophobie<sup>48</sup> registered a rise in transphobic attacks reported to their services.

Anti-trans rhetoric in relation to drag events frequently intersected with the child protection narratives discussed above. In a statement posted to their X page on the day of the Saint-Senoux protest, L’Oriflamme Rennes said that drag performers are “often defined as trans” and are the “exact opposite of what children need, who may be traumatised by such an encounter if they have not yet been indoctrinated.” This conflation also occurred at their in-person protest, where individuals intermixed anti-drag and anti-trans remarks.

Figure 19: Example of a post conflating drag queens and transgender people. The translation of the following post: “Macron and LGBT propaganda at school. Emmanuel Macron is promoting LGBT propaganda in front of children. This extract is a reminder that the reading of transgender stories by drag queens in front of children and sex education at school promoting LGBT propaganda and gender theory are a direct reflection of the ideas of president Macron...”




Figure 20: Screenshot of a post from by the X account of L’Oriflamme Rennes on the day of the Saint-Senoux reading workshop. The text condemns the “LGBT lobby” for using propaganda to indoctrinate children into their “ideology”. The title of the statement is the same phrase which was imprinted on the banners held by protesters from the group.



### Highlighting public funding

Actors often highlighted that drag events are taking place in public libraries, or that the organisations or festivals hosting these events are receiving public funding. Across most of the events, actors applied pressure (including through petitions) on local authorities to cancel shows.

Figure 21: Screenshot of a post denouncing the public money received by a civil society organisation that organised the Bordeaux event. This same post shared the address and email of the organisation.



## Conclusion

**As France celebrated the 10-year anniversary of the Taubira law<sup>49</sup> which legalised gay marriage, former minister of justice Christiane Taubira<sup>50</sup> stated this once contested piece of legislation has now been “absorbed” by French society. In 2013, the law was adopted in a tense environment<sup>51</sup> after months of protests and rallies led by a heterogenous group of actors.<sup>52</sup> The opposition to the Taubira law created new alliances between right-wing, conservative, far-right and ultra-religious groups<sup>53</sup>, and new actors in the anti-gender<sup>54</sup> movement emerged in the French public sphere. These networks now appear to be driving the French anti-drag movement.**

This current effort to cancel drag events is juxtaposed with the widespread success of the first season of *Ru Paul France*, which aired in 2022 and reached audiences<sup>55</sup> outside of the French LGBTQ+ community, contributing to the mainstreaming<sup>56</sup> of drag culture in France. In 2023, there were not many incidents of anti-drag mobilisation in France compared to other geographical contexts, such as the US and UK. Nonetheless, the harassment, hate and violence experienced by the French LGBTQ+ community render examination of French anti-drag events important. In one visceral example, Bilal Hassani, who had already faced online harassment and targeted hate back in 2019 during his Eurovision performance<sup>57</sup>, had to cancel a concert in Metz<sup>58</sup> in April 2023 after far-right and religious groups made threats of violence via social media.

Anti-drag activity should be understood in light of increased hate and violence against the LGBTQ+ community in France, and as a useful lens through which to understand the broader dynamics driving anti-LGBTQ+ hate. Towards the beginning of Pride 2023, a collective of LGBTQ+ French civil society organisations denounced the rise of offline violence (mentioning attacks against LGBTQAI+ centres and physical assaults) in an open letter published in *Tetu*. This comes in the wake of a rise in anti-LGBTQ+, especially anti-trans, discourse in the French public sphere including in the media and on social media platforms. While the majority of anti-drag action in France has so far manifested primarily in the online space, it is evident that the risks of offline mobilisation are escalating rapidly. With the French interior ministry reporting a 19% increase in anti-LGBTQ violence and threats throughout 2023<sup>59</sup>—as well as recent attacks on transgender rights in the national legislature<sup>60</sup>—DQSHs and LGBTQ+ individuals face an increasingly hostile environment in France.

## Endnotes

- 1 Dautry, E, (2023), 'La conteuse est une drag-queen': à Paris, l'atelier de lecture a attiré enfants, soutiens et opposants. Le Parisien. « La conteuse est une drag-queen » : à Paris, l'atelier de lecture a attiré enfants, soutiens et opposants - Le Parisien
- 2 Durox, S (2024), En Bretagne, un collectif se crée pour riposter à l'ultradroite. Le Parisien. <https://www.leparisien.fr/ille-et-vilaine-35/en-bretagne-un-collectif-se-cree-pour-riposter-a-lultradroite-08-02-2024-IIZCLPOH7FCTJGAZDIH7UWLGJM.php>
- 3 Fourel, F, and Gatewood, C, (2022), Amplifying Far-Right Voices: A Case Study on Inauthentic Tactics Used by the Eric Zemmour Campaign. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. <https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/amplifying-far-right-voices-a-case-study-on-inauthentic-tactics-used-by-the-eric-zemmour-campaign/>
- 4 Mayer, C, (2022), A Bordeaux, un événement pour enfants avec une drag-queen pris pour cible par l'extrême droite et l'animateur Cyril Hanouna. Le Monde. [https://www.lemonde.fr/culture/article/2022/12/09/a-bordeaux-un-evenement-pour-enfants-avec-une-drag-queen-cree-la-polemique\\_6153645\\_3246.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/culture/article/2022/12/09/a-bordeaux-un-evenement-pour-enfants-avec-une-drag-queen-cree-la-polemique_6153645_3246.html)
- 5 Mayer, C, (2022).
- 6 Mayer, C, (2022).
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